There has been a major hole in Taiwan’s political scene waiting to be filled for some time: a hunger for politics based not on ethnicity, but on ideals and reform. The early DPP filled that hole: they were dissidents of all ethnicities campaigning to end the one-party state and for democracy. They then--something widely forgotten now--got higher vote shares in the north than the south, winning Taipei City, Taipei County and Taoyuan. Then DPP became dominated by ethnic Taiwanese (Hoklo)-speakers who used that language when campaigning. Historical minorities like Hakka and aborigines were alienated--or outright frightened for historical reasons--and were wooed into the welcoming arms of the Mandarin-speaking, mainlander-dominated KMT. The KMT also dominated the local ethnically Taiwanese factional patronage machines, which gave them the edge overall. The camps became fixed as “pan-green” and “pan-blue” around 2001. The parties allied to entrench this divide for the 2008 legislative elections by agreeing to single-member districts--from multi-member districts before--and creating a 5% voter threshold for party-list assigned legislative seats. These changes largely flushed the smaller parties out.
These ethnic politics are finally collapsing. With the challenge of China and diplomatic isolation, there is today a sense of “us” being all the people of Taiwan, who share a common existence together. The incidents that politicians used to stoke historical animosity are now more-and-more just old history. Apparent culturally for some time, it was the Sunflower Movement that catapulted this new Taiwanese consciousness into the public mind politically: “us” were the people of Taiwan, “they” were China and locals acting in China’s interests. The public agreed.
The majority of the population (Fujianese, Hakka & Cantonese) migrated here during a similar time frame as North America and developed culturally with many influences (aboriginal, Dutch, Spanish, Japanese pirates). In 1895 the Manchurian Qing ceded all claims to Taiwan (it actually only controlled ⅔ of Taiwan) in perpetuity to Japan. Japan made heavy investment to integrate Taiwan, including linguistically by introducing universal education.
Taiwan has been ruled independently of China since 1895, with the semi-exception of 1945-1949 (Australia has only been ruled separately from the UK since 1901). The international press, however, always refers to 1949 as the breaking point between China and Taiwan, which emphasizes the “one China” worldview of the KMT and China--but for the majority the break occurred much further back in history. Even the young generations of most mainlander families (their break is 1949) now identify with their peers locally, not their cousins across the Strait. They also developed separately from China: Mao’s Red Guards were on the rampage while Taiwanese were learning rock n’ roll from locally stationed American soldiers.
To prop up their claim as government of all of China the KMT launched a massive effort to Sinicize Taiwan. Their campaign had successes, especially the widespread use of Mandarin as the standard in public forums instead of Japanese, or the traditional mix of languages. While some--mostly schooled under martial law--consider themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese, the KMT’s efforts to get the population to self-identify as Chinese has failed. Today 3.3% consider themselves “Chinese only”. Removing spouses and elderly actually born in China, the locally born considering themselves “Chinese only” is 1% or less. Two-thirds identify as “Taiwanese only”, and over 90% of the young.
The first casualty of the radical political shift is the collapse of the KMT into small party status. The KMT has been ruled by elite mainlander families with a world-view radically at odds with the Taiwanese-identifying public, as shown by the deep unpopularity of their presidential candidate Hung Hsiu-chu, who languishes below 20% in the polls. When the KMT lost elections in 2000 and 2001 they had a new generation of then popular leaders to take the reigns, like Ma Ying-jeou (called “Mr Clean” then) and Jason Hu. This time they don’t. The next generation are largely foreign passport holders, are uninterested or now identify as Taiwanese. Sean Lien--recently crushed in his run for Taipei mayor--had been one of the few shining hopes for the elites. There is no new blood coming into the elites, it is a spent force.
While the top implodes, the bottom is falling out. The local patronage factions are becoming less relevant and more unpopular. They retain some power in rural areas with people over 50, but not much else. The KMT no longer has much to offer these factions, and many are leaving for the PFP, DPP or the new Minkuodang (MKT). Unpopularity has caused some incumbent legislators to simply give up, leaving the KMT scrambling to find viable candidates. This process is going to accelerate after the election and into the local elections in 2018.
The KMT’s collapse is not creating the giant hole in Taiwan’s politics: it is collapsing because it can’t cope with it. The DPP has adapted better as--along with the broader public--it already self-identifies with Taiwan, not China. Tsai Ing-wen understands the nature of the shift, and emphasizes her Hakka heritage and predominantly uses Mandarin to broaden her appeal. She is making some headway, but she leads a party that is still largely an ethnic Taiwanese-speaking party.
What will stand in opposition to a dominant DPP? In the next legislative session it will be a mix of parties. The KMT will probably be the second largest party, hanging on in some traditional bases. Even in those bases they will lose significant ground, and will continue to lose ground later as the new non-DPP options become clearer. The PFP looks likely to gain from KMT defectors. Some of the new parties like the New Power Party and the Green/Social Democratic Party alliance plus the older TSU will likely have some representation. In practice there won’t be much of an opposition initially, the DPP is set to win a majority and many of the new parties will ally with them on many major issues--like divesting the KMT of their stolen assets.
Eventually a formidable opposition to the DPP will appear. There are two possibilities. The first is that a party or force emerges and the political lines redraw along lines like in other countries--a left/right divide. The DPP could go either way--the party has plenty of politicians on the left and right--more likely they will be pushed towards the centre-right as their power base is often southern and rural, and many of their stars lean to the right, like Tainan mayor William Lai and Taichung mayor Lin Chia-lung.
The other possibility: a new kind of opposition force. This is a serious possibility. Taiwan is at the centre of many world trends; culturally, economically and geographically. It is cutting edge in many ways, and the experience of the Sunflower movement shows that Taiwanese civic groups of wide range can mix-and-match into coalitions to get things done--a more open way of operating. To pass the 5% party list threshold it would need to have a single registered entity, but it could be a loose association. They could lead reforms removing the current barriers to smaller parties.
Prior to the upcoming election, look for more candidates to run for president (aside from the four as of this writing: Tsai, Hung, Soong and Shih). Hung is hopelessly out of tune with the public. The voters will remember why they didn’t vote for Soong the last two times. Shih Ming-teh is a spent force.
An astute and ambitious person should see the opportunity. There are a lot of people who don’t want to vote for Tsai, but don’t like the other candidates much. Someone who could appeal across party lines with an ideals and reform campaign--with Ko Wen-je’s recent win in Taipei very much on the mind--has a great opportunity if articulate and can resonate with voters. To win would still be difficult: some will continue to vote for Hung and Soong, and Tsai has a solid support base. But here’s the thing: this person doesn’t need to win to be successful. The right candidate could accomplish two things. First, change the nature of the debate. Second, if a decent support base is raised, then this person would be a natural for the new opposition to form around--or even lead. This would be a very influential position to be in. Watch who runs with a keen eye.
Regardless of whether it’s a single party or something new, there are a few things that are likely with the new opposition. Either the new force or the DPP (if it moves left) will endorse gay marriage, which the public is already behind. It will be against the opening of the fourth nuclear power plant.
Most importantly the new force will self-identify strongly as Taiwanese, not Chinese. China will not like this development one bit. Chinese president Xi Jinping has already stated his impatience with the Ma government to get on with political status talks on annexing Taiwan into China, something neither the DPP nor any new force will agree to unless under duress. The Chinese Communists have “national reunification” as a main objective, and has convinced the Chinese public that it is the destiny of the Chinese people. Internally, however, the Taiwanese parties will be vying to outdo each other to be seen as the most “truly Taiwanese”. Ironically, the Chinese may end up with the pro-status quo Tsai being the closest thing they have to an ally. Almost no matter what, friction with China will increase unless the Chinese come to genuinely accept Taiwanese really don’t consider themselves Chinese. That won’t come easy.
Welcome to interesting times.
Published in Guan Xi Magazine- Fall 2015 issue
